||[Dec. 24th, 2012|02:06 am]
BAM! Wonderfully put:|
"If Hegel's defect is to underrate the importance of the immediate and contingent [btw this isn't true], Peirce's problem is an inadequate recognition of the role of Thirdness within philosophy itself. To recognize this Thirdness would be to adopt explicitly the point of view (which is often implicitly at work) that philosophical knowledge depends upon the growth and development of ideas; as it is, Peirce is torn between two conceptions of philosophy. His official view leads to an architectonic model which is unrealizable; for his phenomenology, designed to describe what is present to the mind, in fact presupposes a certain conception of mind. In this
respect, Hegel's view that philosophy is a circle seems more appropriate and explains why he has no presuppositionless phenomenology comparable to Peirce's. Although the consideration of Peirce's critique of dialectical philosophy reveals a contradiction in his own approach, it also suggests a way of understanding his arguments and concepts which may be more illuminating than his official methodological pronouncements."
-Gary Shapiro, "Peirce's Critique of Hegel's Phenomenology and Dialectic"